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Frank Costigliola is well known for his unorthodox approach to diplomatic history. His
early trailblazing scholarship introduced culture and psychology as important methodological
devices to the study of American foreign policy. In this sense, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances follows
the path of Costigliola’s earlier works. In his newest book, Costigliola claims that the wartime
alliance between the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain was a product of the personal
relationships between Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill. He
argues that their psychological traits, emotions, experiences, gender identity and sexuality, class,
and education (all things that Costigliola broadly defines as “culture”), downplayed the
importance of national interests, geopolitics, and strategy. “Only by including the overlooked
private lives of public statesmen, the emotional stakes of their diplomacy, and the cultural
context of their ideology can we arrive at a more holistic picture of how the Allies won World
War II and then lost the security they had fought for,” writes Costigliola (p. 20). He concludes
that the Cold War could have been avoided or postponed if only FDR lived longer. When Harry
Truman assumed the task of continuing war alliances and postwar planning, the world inevitably
descended into the Cold War, since Truman, unlike his predecessor, did not have the charm, wit,
emotional intelligence, or intellectual sensibility to nurture a fragile personal relationship with
Stalin.
What is novel about Costigliola’s book is that he explains the success of this wartime
alliance (and its subsequent failure) in terms of personal politics. The book’s originality and
strengths lie in its scope, as well as its imaginative and bold interpretations. Roosevelt’s Lost
Alliances is peppered with anecdotes that Costigliola skillfully employs to elucidate main
characters and their actions in this well-written and exciting narrative about World War II and
the initial phase of the Cold War.
The author dedicates a significant amount of space to “The Women and Men Who
Sustained the Big Three,” who oftentimes significantly shaped policymaking. Costigliola points
out that the disintegration of FDR’s intimate circle in 1944 presented great emotional and
practical difficulties for the President, but also opened space for people who were not committed
to the ideas of the Big Three that were outlined in Tehran and Yalta. In chapter seven, “The
Diplomacy of Trauma,” Costigliola notes that “Soviet experts” George Kennan and Charles
Bohlen – “previously kept at arm’s length, would shape how a neophyte president and his
advisers made sense of the confusing issues arising from the end of war” (p. 260). He claims that
their isolation and unhappiness in Moscow “sparked disorientation, depression and desire for
revenge” (p. 273). This theme has already been introduced by other historians such as Dennis
Dunn. Yet, the strengths of the book, as noted above, contain in themselves inherent weaknesses
that leave space open to readers and scholars for critique.
The greatest strength of this work is its description of Franklin Roosevelt and his inner
circle, and these descriptions are based on a remarkably comprehensive mastery of American
sources. However, this U.S.-centric approach sometimes impairs the strength of the narrative.
The abundance of information and the desire to fit them into the main argument sometimes leads
to irrelevant facts, digressions, historical gossips, and anecdotes presented for their own sake.
For example, Costigliola lengthily describes Pamela Churchill’s sexual escapades. Although fun
to read, they contribute very little to his overall argument.

In addition, this emphasis on American figures leaves many questions about the two
remaining sides of the triangle. Costigliola’s narrative about the Soviets relies mostly on
secondary sources about Stalin and is one of the weakest parts of the book. In a similar manner,
Costigliola did not sufficiently research Winston Churchill although he had the available sources.
Costigliola’s psycho-social portrait of FDR advances our understanding of how his personal
character determined (and limited) his foreign policy, a topic mostly neglected in FDR
biographies such as Jean E. Smith’s FDR, or Nathan Miller's FDR: An Intimate History.
Unfortunately this could not be said about Costigliola’s similar treatment of Stalin and Churchill.
With new biographies focused on their formative years, such as Stephen Kotkin’s Stalin and
Michael Shelden’s Young Titan, Costigliola’s psycho-social assessment of these two statesman is
greatly outdated and obsolete.
Costigliola’s methodological approach puts emphasis on a “holistic picture.” Yet, fans of
diplomatic and military history will find his “holistic picture,” a great exaggeration of cultural
and psychological factors at the expense of traditional themes in diplomatic and military history.
Such readers may find his concept of culture too elusive, wide, and abstract; thus rejecting some
or most of his interpretations and conclusions. With Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances Costigliola joins
unending debate about FDR’s foreign policy and Big Three diplomacy. He provides positive
assessments of FDR’s diplomacy in the framework of the Great Alliance in contrast to Frederick
Marks, Dennis Dunn, or Amos Perlmutter who accuse the President of being naïve in dealing
with Stalin or incriminate him for courting the tyrant.
This book, the winner of the SHAFR’s Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize for 2013, has yet to
stand the test of time. Some of its conclusions and interpretations will be, without a doubt,
rejected. Some of them are not new or unheard-of. However, this book offers some true gems.
FDR’s future biographers will benefit greatly from his interpretations and list of sources. It
expands the field of diplomatic history by introducing methods from neighboring fields of the
discipline. Also, Costigliola produces a masterfully written narrative that is equally interesting to
the wider public and to historians, thus raising the standard for future works in the field. To
conclude with Costigliola’s premise in the form of a question: If FDR lived longer could the
Cold War be averted? William A. Williams wrote in his landmark work The Tragedy of
American Diplomacy that “explorations into the forest of conditional history are sometimes
fruitful, for they occasionally suggest new insights into what did occur” (Williams, 205). And
that is the greatest contribution of Costigliola’s book – it offers a very convincing and fresh
insight into what did occur.
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